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Road safety determinants: do institutions matter? 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2010 the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 64/255 declaring 2011–2020 
the Decade of Action for Road Safety with the main goal of stabilizing and then reducing the level of 
road traffic fatalities (United Nations, 2010). Support for this action from the world’s governments 
reflects the growing awareness that road traffic accidents and fatalities constitute a global public 
health problem. In short, the fact that 1.24 million people lost their lives on the roads in 2010 (World 
Health Organization [WHO], 2013a) and that traffic injuries were the eighth leading cause of death 
globally (Lozano et al., 2012) can no longer be overlooked.  
The problem is particularly alarming in low- and middle-income countries.  According to the 
WHO, 92% of deaths on roads in 2010 occurred in such countries, although they concentrate just 53% 
of the world’s vehicle fleet (WHO, 2013a). The number of fatalities among vulnerable road users (i.e., 
pedestrians, motorcyclists and cyclists) is also higher in low- and middle- income countries. In 
addition, road traffic crashes are associated with high economic costs that seem to hit developing 
economies hardest, with 59% of fatalities occurring among adults who are often the family’s sole 
breadwinner. A study conducted in Bangladesh and India1 shows that most families affected by a road 
traffic fatality experience a significant decline in household income, often causing them to fall below 
the poverty line (Commission for Global Road Safety, 2007). The loss not only affects the victim’s 
family, but also puts a burden on the nation, whose overall productivity is affected by the exit from 
the labor market of some of its most productive workers. In 2005 the costs of road traffic crashes in 
low- and middle-income countries amounted to US$65 billion, while globally the loss was US$518 
billion, representing between 1 and 3% of the world’s gross national product (WHO, 2013a, 2013b). 
                                                          
1
 A study conducted in 2004 by the Transport Research Laboratory commissioned by the Global Road Safety 
Partnership. Available at  www.grsproadsafety.org 
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Although some of these losses are unavoidable, many are preventable. Today, road safety is 
generally assumed to be the shared responsibility of governments and civil society, but reducing the 
burden of traffic accidents still falls largely on the state authorities. There is substantial evidence from 
studies of road safety and its determinants to show that governments can play an active role. Taking 
their lead from Nilsson (2002), for instance, Elvik, Høye, Vaa, and Sørensen (2009) identify 128 road 
safety measures which governments can use to enhance road safety. These measures address all 
aspects of road systems and allow ample scope for action in the public sector, where road authorities 
can be joined by other public institutions – including the health authorities (hospitals, ambulance 
services), the police force and education authorities – in the provision of road safety. Indeed, public 
sector policymakers can be viewed as “producers of traffic safety”, which in turn can be characterized 
as a public good that is “consumed by the general public” (Maier, Gerking, & Weiss, 1989). It is 
reasonable, therefore, to suppose that if a set of factors has a significant impact on a government’s 
provision of public goods, these factors should also influence the provision of road safety as a public 
good.  
The research also shows that the quality and quantity of public goods vary systematically 
according to a country’s political institutions and economic policy. On the one hand, theoretical 
research on economic policy outcomes has developed and empirically tested several models on how 
electoral rules and forms of government influence the size and composition of government spending. 
The models presented by Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002), and 
Persson and Tabellini (2000) predict that governments elected by proportional representation are 
more likely to implement public spending programs that benefit large groups of the population. In 
their theoretical research on the impact of different forms of government on public spending, 
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) develop a formal model which predicts that presidential regimes 
lead to smaller governments and less redistribution than is the case under parliamentary 
democracies. These predictions are empirically tested by Persson and Tabellini (2004), who find that 
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electoral rules and forms of government shape the size and composition of government spending. 
More evidence supporting the theoretical priors is provided in Persson and Tabellini (2003).  
Additionally, research on government spending and the provision of public goods under 
dictatorship and democracy finds that democratization generally has a significant impact on public 
outlay. McGuire and Olson (1996), among others, predict higher levels of public good provision under 
democracies than under dictatorships and Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003),  
Deacon (2009), Lake and Baum (2001)  present empirical evidence to support this, although Mulligan, 
Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find no significant difference in the provision of social and economic 
policies under the two types of regime.  
The impact of democratic institutions on policy outcomes can be particularly important in 
developing countries, whose political institutions have undergone significant transformations in 
recent decades: less than 10% of low-income and only one third of middle-income countries were 
democracies in 1975 (Figure 1), while these percentages increased to more than 80% by 2009. The 
institutional changes brought about by democratization have led to significant modifications in their 
systems of governance and have had a marked impact on different aspects of the public sector.  
<<Insert Figure 1 about here >> 
Road safety is one of the outcomes that appears to have benefited from this democratization 
process: the evidence in Figure 2 shows that democratic institutions are associated with better road 
safety, which suggests that research should be conducted into the role of institutions and the causal 
links between democratization and road safety. 
<<Insert Figure 2 about here >> 
To date, few academic studies have addressed the relationship between institutions and road 
safety outcomes. Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register (2006) analyzed the association between public 
sector corruption and traffic fatalities. Grimm and Treibich (2010) used indices of institutional quality 
to study the effect of income on variability in traffic fatalities. Law, Noland, and Evans (2009) 
 4 
 
considered governance and the quality of political institutions to explore the factors underlying the 
Kuznets curve relationship for motorcycle deaths. But to the best of our knowledge there have been 
no attempts at assessing the impact of democratic regimes on road safety. The objective of our 
research, therefore, is to fill this gap by empirically analyzing the effect of democratic institutions on 
road safety, using multivariate models with country-level panel data. The rest of this paper seeks to 
answer the question: “What role is played by democratic political regimes, forms of government and 
electoral rules in shaping road safety outcomes?” Our results make a twofold contribution to the 
literature. First, they suggest that democratization does have an important and significant impact on 
the provision of road safety. Second, they show that road safety can be characterized as a local public 
good. These results have direct and sound policy implications everywhere, but are particularly 
relevant for developing countries due to their poorer road safety outcomes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on institutions 
as determinants of public policy outcomes. Section 3 examines the literature on road safety 
determinants. Our data, methodology and empirical models are presented in Section 4. The results 
are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 
The literature on economic policymaking analyzes the role played by political institutions in 
resolving conflicts among groups of voters and politicians. According to Myerson (1995), a political 
system’s structure and related system of incentives determine political decisions and strategies, 
influencing government performance. As such, the policy outcomes of this policymaking process tend 
to be influenced by the prevailing political institutions. 
Persson et al. (2000), for example, propose a public spending model for comparing 
presidential-congressional and parliamentary regimes and predict that presidential regimes produce 
smaller governments with inefficiently low spending on public goods. The empirical results 
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corroborate that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes. Persson and Tabellini’s 
(2000) model is based on the trade-off a candidate faces when making a binding promise to supply a 
public good that benefits everyone (“universal” spending) or to target redistribution to a specific 
group or groups (“targetable” spending). The model predicts that parliamentary systems and 
proportional elections help produce spending programs that allocate revenues more evenly to broad 
and stable groups of the population. The model presented by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) examines 
the trade-off that elected representatives face between allegiance to geographic constituencies and 
social constituencies, predicting that in proportional systems voters elect representatives prone to 
spending on transfers, while in majoritarian systems voters elect candidates prone to (local) public 
good spending. Their empirical results support the theoretical priors of the model. A further 
theoretical contribution is made by Lizzeri and Persico (2001), in whose politico-economic model 
office-seeking candidates face a trade-off between allocating public money to public goods or to 
pork-barrel projects. The model predicts that the proportional system is more efficient when the 
public good is very valuable and the winner-take-all system is more efficient when it is not very 
valuable. The empirical results of Persson and Tabellini (2003) suggest that presidential regimes have 
smaller governments than parliamentary regimes, and that majoritarian elections induce smaller 
governments, generate less welfare spending and smaller deficits than those resulting from 
proportional elections. Similar results are obtained in Persson and Tabellini (2004), who find that 
majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs, while presidential 
regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies. Albalate, Bel, and Elias (2012) 
analyze the effect of democratization and the impact of electoral rule and form of government on 
national defense, finding that military spending is greater in presidential democracies with 
majoritarian electoral rule.  
Another strand of the literature on political institutions compares the provision of public 
goods under authoritarian and democratic regimes. Mulligan et al. (2004) find no significant 
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differences in policy outcomes in economically similar democracies and non-democracies. Stroup 
(2007) finds that governments with more democratic freedoms do not necessarily generate public 
policy that effectively provides public goods. However, the theoretical literature generally predicts 
that fewer resources are allocated to public good provision under dictatorial regimes than under 
democracies, and this is supported by the empirical papers. For instance, Lake and Baum (2001) 
construct and empirically test a theoretical model in which states are conceived as natural 
monopolies for public service provision and they find that fewer public services are provided under 
dictatorships. In the same vein, Deacon (2009) adapts a model of probabilistic voting to analyze the 
allocation of a government budget between a public good and transfers under dictatorship and 
democracy. Deacon’s prediction that the level of public good provision is lower in dictatorships than 
in democracies is supported by results from his empirical analysis. Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 
(2004) analyze the effect of political institutions on the level of public health expenditure and on 
health outcomes, finding that democracy is associated with higher total health spending. Profeta, 
Puglisi and Scabrosetti (2013) analyze the impact of democracy on military spending, finding an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between defense expenditure and the strength of democratic 
institutions. Finally, in the literature on the political economy of investment, Saiz (2006) finds that 
dictatorships invest more in road quality and quantity.  
All in all, our literature review yields sound empirical evidence that the level of public good 
provision depends on a country’s political institutions, making it reasonable to suppose that the 
provision of road safety as a public good will vary across countries governed by different political 
institutions. First, the literature suggests that authoritarian regimes provide fewer public goods, and 
we would therefore expect authoritarian countries to have poorer road safety outcomes. Second, 
presidential democracies with majoritarian electoral rule are found to have smaller governments and 
spend less on public goods than do parliamentary democracies with proportional electoral systems. 
We expect countries with presidential systems and majoritarian electoral rule to have higher numbers 
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of traffic accidents and fatalities. We test these hypotheses with a multivariate model which controls 
for institutional variables and other road safety determinants. The following section reviews the 
literature on these factors.   
 
3. RESEARCH ON ROAD SAFETY DETERMINANTS 
Much of the academic work on road safety focuses on the effectiveness of road safety 
measures that neutralize and diminish the risk factors of traffic accidents, injuries and fatalities. Three 
main groups of measures – user-associated measures, concerned with road-user behavior; vehicle-
related measures, aimed at improving vehicle safety; and road infrastructure-related measures – are 
commonly explored in the literature. The research concerned with road-user behavior and in-car 
safety analyzes the impact of traffic regulations and their enforcement, while the literature on road 
infrastructure-related measures assesses the effects of road characteristics and traffic conditions.   
Among recent studies evaluating the implementation and enforcement of regulatory 
measures, many papers evaluate the effect of speed limit modification. They report mixed results and 
suggest that the effect of speed limit modifications is uneven and may be divergent for different 
groups of drivers (for example, see Dee & Sela, 2003; Tay, 2009). The effectiveness of seat belt laws is 
also extensively analyzed. Carpenter and Stehr (2008) and Cohen and Einav (2003) find that seat belt 
usage has a positive impact on road safety, while other papers (e.g., Derrig, Segui-Gomes, Abtahi, & 
Ling-Ling, 2002) find little or no evidence of safety belt effectiveness. The restrictive regulation of 
blood alcohol limits is generally found to be effective in improving road safety (see, amongst others, 
Albalate, 2008; Kaplan & Prato, 2007). This positive effect on road safety does not hold for the 
mandatory periodic motor vehicle inspection (see Christensen & Elvik, 2007; Sutter & Poitras, 2002).  
Studies on the impact of road infrastructure usually report mixed results and seem to be 
dependent on particular cases and on the variables taken into account (Albalate et al., 2012). For 
instance, Anastasopoulos, Tarko, and Mannering (2008), Flahaut (2004), Park, Carlson, Porter, and 
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Andersen (2012), all find positive effects of better quality roads (broader lane-width, larger number of 
lanes, better paving, median strips and shoulders), while the results obtained by Noland (2003) 
undermine the hypothesis that improvements in road infrastructure effectively reduce fatalities and 
injuries.  This divergence seems to be mostly due to the strength of the Peltzman effect (Peltzman, 
1975), where drivers respond to improved safety measures by taking greater risks and so offset the 
effectiveness of the improved road infrastructure. Many studies (e.g., Haynes et al., 2008) also report 
that traffic conditions constitute an important determinant of road safety.  
Another strand of literature on the determinants of road safety investigates the effect of 
socioeconomic variables. Some of these studies also consider the effect of institutions. For instance, 
the research by Jacobs and Cutting (1986) explores the relationship between the fatality rate and 
socio-economic and physical characteristics of developing countries such as per capita GDP, the 
number of circulating vehicles, road density, vehicle density, population per physician and population 
per hospital bed. It finds that the variable that has the greatest impact on the number of fatalities is 
vehicle ownership, and that per capita GDP, vehicle density and population per hospital bed are 
contributing factors. 
In their research on the relationship between traffic fatalities and economic development, 
Anbarci et al. (2006) find that a decrease in public sector corruption reduces traffic deaths, and that 
the number of fatalities increases in income up to a threshold of US$15,000 and then decreases. 
These results are obtained for a cross-country panel data set where the variation in the number of 
road traffic fatalities is explained by the level of public sector corruption and other socio-economic 
variables (per capita GDP, illiteracy and fatality rates, motorization, population structure).  
Another analysis of the effect of economic growth on traffic fatalities in low- and high-income 
countries is conducted in Bishai, Quresh, James, and Ghaffar (2006). The findings show that in low 
income countries per capita GDP growth is associated with an increase in traffic crashes, injuries and 
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deaths, while in high income countries the increase in per capita GPD lowers the number of traffic 
fatalities but does not alter the number of crashes and injuries.  
Law et al. (2009) also estimate the relationship between per capita income and traffic 
fatalities investigating the Kuznets curve relationship for motorcycle deaths. Using political rights and 
corruption indices as proxies for governance and the quality of political institutions, the authors find 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between motorcycle deaths and per capita income. They also find 
that the implementation of road safety regulations and the improvement of institutional quality, 
medical care and technology significantly reduce motorcycle deaths. 
According to Grimm and Treibich (2010), the results of the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between income and traffic fatalities must be interpreted with caution. They suggest that income is a 
proxy for such factors as road network quality, the degree of motorization and the implementation 
and enforcement of regulations, and that it affects road safety through channel variables such as 
population and traffic density, risk-taking behavior or alcohol consumption. They find that the U-
shaped relationship between income and road traffic fatalities does not hold when the effect of 
income on the variability of fatalities is disentangled from the effect of the channel variables. Neither 
does the effect of income seem significant in explaining the variation in fatalities within high- and 
low-income countries.  
Vereeck and Vrolix (2007) also argue that per capita income must be treated as a complex 
indicator that comprises several factors: the average age of the vehicle fleet, road construction and 
maintenance, education level and economic conditions. Controlling for these factors and for traffic 
exposure, population characteristics and alcohol consumption, the authors explore how social 
willingness to comply with the law affects driver behavior and traffic fatalities. They find that social 
willingness to comply is an important factor and that this matters more to drivers than the content of 
the legal rule (legal specificity). 
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From this literature review we can conclude that there is a consensus on the set of factors 
that are most relevant to road safety: traffic exposure, road infrastructure characteristics, socio-
economic variables, traffic regulation and driver behavior.2 The aim of our research is to implement a 
model to predict cross-country road safety variability using these safety factors and a further set of 
explanatory variables associated with democratic institutions. To our knowledge, this is the first time 
this kind of modeling has been conducted.  
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To analyze the relationship between institutions and road safety we employ a panel of annual 
country data. The panel includes data for 138 countries over 35 years (1975-2009). These data 
comprise information on traffic fatalities, accidents with injuries, institutional variables and other 
controls (road network quality, traffic exposure and socio-economic variables). A summary of the 
descriptive statistics is provided in Table 1 and detailed information on our variables and data sources 
is given in Table 2. Unfortunately, the total number of observations in our analysis has been reduced, 
due to missing values, so we have to deal with an unbalanced data set.  
<<Insert Tables 1, 2 about here >> 
We employ Hausman’s (Hausman, Bronwyn, & Griliches, 1984) negative binomial regression 
model, a specification that has been shown to yield a good fit for the analysis of count data, such as 
the number of traffic accidents and fatalities, and which has become the most frequently used 
specification in crash-frequency modeling (Lord & Mannering, 2010). Negative binomial estimators 
are more efficient than Poisson estimates because they control for the overdispersion commonly 
present in count data (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The descriptive statistics of our dependent variables 
reported in Table 3 show that the unconditional means of fatality and accident counts are much lower 
                                                          
2
 A detailed study of the effects of a range of different factors on road safety can be found in Bester (2000). 
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than their variance, which indicates the presence of overdispersion and suggests that the negative 
binomial model is an appropriate specification.  
<<Insert Table 3 about here >> 
The reasonable within- and between-variability of all the dependent variables (Table 3) 
facilitates the use of the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model. This model allows for the 
correlation between common unobserved effects and the dependent variables, and overcomes the 
problem of omitted variable bias by collecting all the time-invariant information omitted in the fixed 
effects. The random-effects model may also be used, but it gives inconsistent estimates if shared 
unobserved effects are correlated with the regressors. In our analysis we employ both fixed- and 
random-effects specifications. The coefficient estimates obtained are consistently robust as regards 
their sign and, with some exceptions, their significance.  
We estimate two models. Model 1 (Eq. 1) is employed for the full sample. Here we assess the 
effect of democratization on road safety. Model 2 (Eq. 2) is an extended model, in which we 
incorporate institutional variables that identify two specific traits of democracies: the electoral rule 
and the form of government. Model 2 is, therefore, estimated only for democratic countries and 
examines the effect of the traits of democracy on road safety. 
      Ln(λit)=ln(vehkmit) + δLeveldemocit + βXit + TEt + si + εit                                                                                                               (1) 
Ln(λit)=ln(vehkmit) + δ1Leveldemocit  + δ2Presidentialit+ δ3Majorit+ βXit + TEt + si + εit                           (2) 
 where i=1,…N; t=1….Ti 
The dependent variable λit is the expected value of Yit  and Var(Yit ) = λit (1+ai) where ai is the 
rate of overdispersion for each country. Yit is either the number of traffic fatalities (fat) or the number 
of traffic accidents resulting in injuries (accinj). We implement these two variables to identify two 
dimensions of road safety: the severity of accidents captured by the fatality counts, and a broader 
measure captured by the number of accidents. 
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Eq. (1) is estimated for the full sample of countries and the institutional variable considered 
here is leveldemoc. It takes values from 1 to 7, where 1 is given to the least democratic countries and 
7 to the most democratic countries3. Eq. (2) is estimated for democratic countries only (leveldemoc 
equal to 6 or 7) and, in addition to the leveldemoc institutional variable, the model employs 
Presidential and Major binary variables. These variables take a value of one, respectively, if the 
democracy is presidential and if the electoral rule is majoritarian. Otherwise, they take a value of 
zero.   
Vector Xit collects (1) the time-varying controls related to the quality of the road network, i.e., 
the density of the road network (density), the share of motorways (sharemw) and the share of paved 
roads (paved)4, and (2) the socio-economic time-varying controls, i.e., the logarithm of per capita GDP 
(lgdppc), the growth of per capita GDP (grthgdppc), the urban population concentration (urbrate) and 
the share of people over 65 years old (pop65up). 
TEt is a vector of variables related to time effects. First, we introduce a general time trend 
(trend) for all countries in order to account for the time patterns affecting road safety. Then, we 
replace the general trend with three different time trends: for low-income countries (trendl), middle-
income countries (trendm) and high-income countries (trendh), to control for possible divergent time 
patterns between countries of different income levels. In the second model we introduce year-
specific dummy variables for the first ten years following democratization to quantify the dynamics of 
the process. 
N is the number of countries, Ti is the year for the i-th country and εit is the error term. In the 
fixed-effect specification si denotes either a country-specific fixed or random effect. The parameters 
                                                          
3
 See Table 2 for more information on how the leveldemoc variable is constructed 
4
 Since the sharemw variable has more missing values than paved, we employ paved rather than sharemw in 
the second model (estimated only for democratic countries) to maintain a stable number of observations 
across the two models. 
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of the model are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. The number of vehicles per km 
network (vehkm) is an offset variable5 accounting for the fact that countries with a higher level of 
motorization per network kilometer should have more traffic accidents and fatalities. In the 
estimation the coefficient of its logarithm is restricted to one.  
 
5. RESULTS 
First, we assess the effect of democratic institutions on traffic fatalities and accidents (Model 
1). The results are displayed in Tables 4 and 5. Then, we assess the impact of two dimensions of 
democracy: the form of government and the electoral rule (Model 2). The results are shown in Tables 
6 and 7. In each of these tables (4 through to 7), columns (1) and (2) display the results for fixed - and 
random-effects estimations without trend variables, while columns (3) to (4) and (5) to (6) show the 
results for fixed- and random-effects estimations with general trend and with three income-specific 
time trends, respectively. In Tables 6 and 7, columns (7) and (8) are added to show our results for the 
regressions with year-specific dummy variables for the first ten years after countries become 
democratic. The pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables with at least one correlation 
coefficient higher than 0.40 are reported in Table 8.6  
<<Insert Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 about here >> 
 
                                                          
5
 While traffic volume might be better as the offset, the variable available in the IRF’s WRS database has a lot of 
missing values. We do not employ it in our final estimations, but we check the consistency of our results by 
estimating both models with the traffic volume offset variable. This modification does not substantially alter 
our original results.  
6
 Two variables - pop65up and trendh - show  high correlation coefficients. Nonetheless, the estimation of the 
Model (1) and (2) excluding these variables showed no significant alteration in coefficient estimates for 
other covariates, suggesting the absence of multicollinearity problem. 
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Institutional variables 
As expected, democratic institutions have a marked impact on road safety. The coefficient 
estimates of the leveldemoc variable are negative across all regressions and statistically significant in 
all but one. The negative sign suggests that democracy has a positive effect on road safety.7 This 
result is applicable not only to countries in a process of democratic transition but also to established 
democracies consolidating their democratic institutions. The results for the traffic accident counts in 
the estimation for the full sample are particularly notable because of the high significance (one 
percent) of all coefficients. This outcome is in line with the theoretical prediction that more 
democratic regimes are associated with higher levels of public good provision.  
Our empirical results for the voting system show that the majoritarian voting rule has a 
positive effect on road safety, reducing the number of traffic fatalities. This can be interpreted using 
the model developed by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1999), which draws on the differentiation 
between systems of majoritarian and proportional representation based on district magnitude: under 
the proportional electoral system there is a single electoral district, while majoritarian systems use 
multiple-district elections. The difference in district magnitude across the two systems results in 
differences in public good provision: fiercer competition for the marginal district in majoritarian 
systems leads to smaller internalization of voter costs and benefits and, hence, to a lower level of 
public good provision than in proportional systems. A further theoretical result is offered by Milesi-
Ferretti et al. (2002). In this model, the proportional system voters elect representatives whose 
spending satisfies a great variety of interests nationwide, while in majoritarian systems voters elect 
candidates committed to local public good spending. Consequently, one explanation for our empirical 
                                                          
7
 Instead of leveldemoc we also conduct the estimations with a binary variable which takes a value of one if the 
country is democratic and zero otherwise. The coefficient estimates obtained for this variable are 
statistically significant and negative, and its inclusion does not qualitatively alter the estimates for other 
regressors. 
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findings may be that voters consider road safety to be more properly a local public good, and give 
more incentives to increase its provision to politicians elected in majoritarian systems.  
Our results for the form of government suggest that there are more traffic accidents in 
presidential than in parliamentary democracies. This confirms the prediction that presidential 
democracies provide lower levels of road safety as a public good than parliamentary democracies. 
The effect on traffic fatalities is not clear, since all but one coefficient estimates for the form of 
government are statistically non-significant.  
 
Road infrastructure quality variables 
The impact of road network density on both traffic fatalities and accidents is positive and 
statistically significant in the Model 1 estimation. The sign of the coefficient indicates that the 
number of traffic fatalities and accidents increases with increasing road density, since denser 
networks might mean that the greater supply of roads induces greater demand and, hence, more 
accidents. The effect is not evident in Model 2, where the coefficient estimates are mostly non-
significant and, on occasions, negative and significant at the five and ten per cent levels.  
The effect of the share of paved roads on road safety is beneficial: the sign of the coefficient 
estimates for both traffic fatalities and accidents is negative and statistically significant in both 
models. This result is largely intuitive since we expect a larger number of paved roads to enhance 
road safety.  
The coefficient estimates for the share of motorways are positive and statistically significant 
in the estimation for traffic fatality counts. This suggests that a larger number of motorways has a 
negative effect on road safety, possibly because of the higher demand induced by a greater supply of 
better roads and because of the Peltzman effect (see explanation in Section 3 above). The estimations 
for the accident counts yield negative and statistically significant coefficients when time trends are 
not considered and positive and significant coefficients when the three income-specific trends are 
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included. This may be explained by the significance of the time trends, which capture the 
improvement in road infrastructure technology.    
 
Socio-economic variables 
The concentration of population in urban areas displays a significant negative effect on road 
safety across both models. This result is consistent with the literature, which reports a higher relative 
risk of accidents with injuries in urban areas (Elvik et al., 2009). The increase in per capita GDP seems 
to have a negative effect on road safety by increasing the number of traffic fatalities. However, the 
coefficient is significant only in the regressions without time trends in Model 1 and without income-
specific time trends in Model 2, which may be explained by higher rates of motorization leading to 
more traffic crashes and deaths in developing economies. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient estimates for the income-specific control variable suggest that high income countries 
experience fewer accidents and fatalities from traffic crashes. The result for the elderly population 
control variable presents a positive sign in estimations for traffic accident counts. In the estimations 
for fatality counts without time trends the greater proportion of elderly people results in fewer 
fatalities. When the time trends are included, the coefficient estimates become either positive and 
statistically significant or non-significant. This change may be explained by the significance of the time 
trends, which capture the improvement in medical technology that is essential for the post-crash 
medical care associated with a smaller number of deaths caused by traffic accidents.  
 
Trends and time effect variables 
The general time trend and the trends for high- and middle-income countries are negative 
and statistically significant across both models. The negative signs of the coefficient suggest that 
growing public awareness of road safety and improvements in technology have a very clear and 
positive effect on road safety. This positive dynamic seems to occur only in high-income countries, 
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since the coefficient estimates for the low-income countries are non-significant in the estimations for 
fatality counts and positively significant in the estimations for accident counts. The notable difference 
between the coefficient estimates associated with the time trends for middle- and high-income 
countries8 supports the conclusion that the richer the country, the greater the rewards of improved 
road safety. In addition, the significance of the time trends may show that road safety benefits from 
other important factors not included in our regressions. This is important for our analysis, since we 
cannot rely on either regulation or enforcement variables. The favorable effect of traffic laws on road 
safety can be captured by significant time trends.  
Interesting results are obtained for the timing effects of democratization on road safety. Our 
analysis is similar to analyses on democratic transitions and economic growth (Papaioannou & 
Siourounis, 2008), and to the literature assessing the lag in effectiveness of road safety regulations 
(e.g., Albalate, 2008; or Eisenberg, 2003). The dynamics of the timing effects are shown in Figures 3 
and 4. They suggest that (1) a country’s transition from autocratic to democratic regime leads to a 
decrease in the number of traffic fatalities and accidents; (2) there is a delay of four years before 
democratization starts to have a significant effect on road safety; (3) considering the sizes of 
coefficients, the impact of democratization becomes greatest in the sixth year of the country’s 
transition. 
<<Insert Figures 3, 4 about here >> 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
International institutions and national governments alike recognize that the deaths and 
injuries resulting from road traffic accidents are a major public health concern, above all in low- and 
                                                          
8
 Our tests find that the difference between coefficient estimates associated with the high- and middle-income 
trend variables is statistically significant.    
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middle-income countries. Although some of these losses are unavoidable, many are preventable. 
Today, reducing the burden of traffic accidents falls largely on the state authorities and, in this regard, 
governments can be seen as producers, and the general public as consumers, of road safety as a 
public good. Drawing on the results from the research on political institutions and economic policy, 
which indicate that public good provision varies systematically with the political institutions allocating 
public revenues, we argue that the level of provision of road safety is likewise influenced by the 
prevailing political institutions.  
The descriptive statistics presented in the introduction to this paper and the results of our 
empirical study show that political institutions do play an important role in determining the toll of 
traffic accidents and fatalities. Above all, our results suggest that lower rates of fatalities and 
accidents are associated with democracies, and that the process of democratization has a beneficial 
and significant effect on road safety. Democratization would therefore seem to be an important 
process for stabilizing and then reducing the level of road traffic fatalities. However, we find that 
democratization does not have an immediate impact, it requiring around four years for its effects to 
start to become statistically noticeable. This suggests that democratic institutions need time to set up 
the bodies and implement the policies that produce better road safety outcomes. Yet, having said 
this, it is surprising just how quickly the effects become statistically significant. Interestingly, not only 
the beneficial effects of democratization apparent in countries making the transition to democracy, 
but they are also discernible in established democracies that are consolidating their political 
institutions. 
The impact of democratic institutions on road safety is particularly significant in the low- and 
middle-income countries that were at the epicenter of the democratization process which took place 
in the last decades of the twentieth century. Yet, their performance in this area still leaves much to be 
desired. Reports issued by the international institutions claim that low- and middle-income countries 
continue to underperform on issues of road safety because of a lack of funding and political concern. 
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Indeed, even though the health costs attributable to road traffic injuries are comparable to those of 
malaria and tuberculosis, the fight against disease attracts greater political concern and financial 
support. Our characterization here of road safety as a local public good perhaps corroborates the 
evidence that it remains a secondary objective. In comparison, healthcare justifiably is given priority 
status, as low-income countries concentrate their efforts on disease prevention and eradication.  
However, simply raising political awareness and increasing public spending on road safety are 
insufficient. If strong efficient institutions are not created, the general indifference to traffic laws and 
the authorities that enforce them can hamper effective outcomes. To understand more clearly the 
effect of these factors, future research needs to focus on the variables of regulation, enforcement and 
compliance. The consideration of road safety as the shared responsibility of governments and civil 
society suggests that social capital can also be a significant factor in this approach.   
Overall, our research shows that the inclusion of institutional variables in the analysis of road 
safety determinants provides new insights in the analysis of traffic safety and the provisions of public 
goods. But if we are to alleviate the burden imposed by traffic accidents, especially in the world’s 
poorest economies, we need a better understanding of the causal links between political institutions 
and road safety.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1. The share of democracies in 1975, 1993 and 2009 classified by income level.
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Figure 2. Traffic fatalities and accidents with injuries per vehicles x 1000, by regime type and income 
level. Average value 1975–2009. 
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Figure 3. Timing effects. The impact of the first ten years of democracy on traffic fatality counts. 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the significance of the coefficient estimates. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Figure 4.  Timing effects. The impact of the first ten years of democracy on traffic accident counts 
(accidents with injuries). 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the significance of the coefficient estimates. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 1. Sample statistics summary 
Variable 
Number 
observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  
    
  
Dependent variables 
fat 2851 3876465 10426.6 4.5 125660 
accinj 2659 75607.57 251039.5 85 2425054 
       Institutional variables           
leveldemoc 4462 5.286195 2.155548 1 7 
presidential 4458 0.5361148 0.49875 0 1 
major 3438 0.6614311 0.4732918 0 1 
       Infrastructure variables 
    
  
sharemw 1618 0.0172571 0.075184 0 1 
density 2799 0.9109287 5.071533 0.005 256 
paved 2633 52.29992 33.32716 0.15 100 
       Socio-economic controls           
lgdppc 4240 8.009008 1.624284 3.912867 11.38187 
grthgdppc 4237 1.698487 6.123588 -50.23583 91.67289 
pop65up 4830 6.906763 4.598957 0.3649629 22.28709 
urbrate 4757 33.58355 18.46835 2.563864 100 
       Offset (exposure) variable           
vehkm 2424 28.94152 35.11312 0.05 429 
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Table 2. Definition of variables, definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables   
Fatalities Number of deaths in road 
accidents 
International Road Federation (IRF) World Road 
Statistics (WRS) 1963–1989, WRS 1990–1999 and WRS 
2000–2010 
Accidents Number of road accidents 
with injuries 
IRF WRS 1963–1989, WRS 1990–1999 and WRS 2000–
2010 
Institutional variables   
Level of democracy Variable ranging from 1 (the 
most autocratic countries) to 7 
(the most democratic 
countries) 
Database of Political Institutions (Keefer, 2010). 
Constructed as equal to the Executive Index of 
Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC). A competitively 
elected prime-minister scores 6 or 7. If a chief 
executive receives less than 75% of the votes, the 
score is 7. If a chief executive receives more than 75% 
of the votes, the score is 6.  A country is considered to 
be autocratic or a country where democratic 
institutions are not consolidated and leadership is 
personality-based if the EIEC is below 6. 
Democracy A dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if country is 
democratic and zero 
otherwise.  
Database of Political Institutions and authors' own. 
Constructed from EIEC. If the EIEC is below 6, then the 
country is deemed autocratic or a country where 
democratic institutions are not consolidated and 
leadership is personality-based. 
Democratization 
timing effects  
A dummy variable that takes a 
value of one in a particular 
year after a country’s 
democratization (only the first 
ten years are considered) 
Database of Political Institutions and authors' own. 
Presidential A dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the democracy 
is presidential and zero if it is 
parliamentary 
Database of Political Institutions. Constructed from 
SYSTEM. As in Albalate et al. (2012), all assembly-
elected president democracies are considered 
parliamentarian. 
Majoritarian A dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the country has 
a majoritarian electoral rule 
and zero if the electoral rule is 
proportional. 
Database of Political Institutions. Constructed from 
PLURALITY. In plurality systems, legislators are elected 
using a winner-take-all/first past the post rule. 
PLURALITY equals one if this system is used and zero 
otherwise. 
Infrastructure   
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variables 
Share motorways Share of motorways over the 
total road network  
IRF WRS 1963–1989, WRS 1990–1999 and WRS 2000–
2010. Constructed as a ratio between the length of 
motorways and the length of the total road network. 
Density Density of total network (kms 
per sq. km) 
IRF WRS 1963–1989, WRS 1990–1999 and WRS 2000–
2010 
Paved Percentage of paved roads 
over the total road network 
IRF WRS 1963–1989, WRS 1990–1999 and WRS 2000–
2010 
Socio-economic 
controls 
  
LGDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita (constant 2005 US$) 
WDI database (World Bank, 2012) and authors’ own  
Growth GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita growth (annual 
%) 
WDI database 
Population over 65 Share of population older than 
65  
WDI database 
Urban concentration 
of population 
Population in the largest city 
as a percentage of urban 
population 
WDI database 
Exposure variable   
Vehicles per km Units of vehicles per  km of 
road network  
IRF WRS 1963–1989, WRS 1990–1999 and WRS 2000–
2010 
Other variables   
Trend A variable that captures the 
effects of time. It takes a value 
of one for the first year in the 
sample (1975) and increases 
by one for each passing year. 
Authors' own 
Trend low income 
countries 
A variable that takes a value of 
one for the first year in the 
sample (1975) and increases 
by one for each passing year 
for low income countries only. 
IRF WRS 2000–2010 and authors' own. Countries 
considered are classified as “low income” in IRF WRS 
2000–2010. 
Trend middle income 
countries 
A variable that takes a value of 
one for the first year in the 
IRF WRS 2000–2010 and authors' own. Countries 
considered are classified as “lower middle income” 
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sample (1975) and increases 
by one for each passing year 
for middle income countries 
only. 
and “upper middle income” in IRF WRS 2000–2010. 
Trend high income 
countries 
A variable that takes a value of 
one for the first year in the 
sample (1975 ) and increases 
by one for each passing year 
for high income countries only. 
IRF WRS 2000–2010 and authors' own. Countries 
considered are classified as “high income” in IRF WRS 
2000–2010. 
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Table 3. Variability and overdispersion. Dependent variables and institutional variables 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
              
fat overall 3876.47 10426.60 4.50 125660.00 N =    2851 
  between 
 
9083.45 17.06 71727.44 n =     138 
  within 
 
4210.34 -49969.13 57809.03 T-bar = 20.6594 
  
     
  
accinj overall 75607.57 251039.5 85 2425054 N = 2659 
  between 
 
190720.7 111 2051122 n=138 
  within 
 
44236.56 -427717.1 555720.6 T-bar=19.681 
              
leveldemoc overall 5.29 2.16 1 7 N =    4462 
  between 
 
1.67 2 7 n =     138 
  within 
 
0.35 0.43 1.,20 T-bar = 32.3333 
  
     
  
presidential overall 0.54 0.50 0 1 N =    4458 
  between 
 
0.46 0 1 n =     138 
  within 
 
0.20 -0.41 1.45 T-bar = 32.3043 
              
major overall 0.66 0.47 0 1 N =    3438 
  between 
 
0.43 0 1 n =     132 
  within 
 
0.18 -0.31 1.63 T-bar = 26.0455 
              
Note: The overall and within statistics are calculated over N country-years of data. The between standard deviation is 
calculated over n countries. The average number of years each country was observed during T-bar years. 
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Table 4. Results: Negative binomial estimates for fatality counts. Full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
  fatfe1 fatre1 fatfe2 fatre2 fatfe3 fatre3    
Institutional variables 
    
                
leveldemoc -0.0333* -0.0317* -0.0360** -0.0392** -0.0432** -0.0449*** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0130)    
Infrastructure variables           
sharemw 1.8540*** 1.8178*** 1.5199*** 1.5111*** 1.7247*** 1.6997*** 
 
(0.2407) (0.2461) (0.2983) (0.2942) (0.2671) (0.2650)    
       density 0.1542*** 0.1228*** 0.2560*** 0.2148*** 0.3028*** 0.2626*** 
  (0.0220) (0.0234) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0229)    
Socio-economic controls 
     grthgdppc 0.0050* 0.0054* 0.0034 0.0042 0.0003 0.0011    
 
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)    
       lgdppc -0.4804*** -0.5084*** -0.2570*** -0.3331*** -0.1384** -0.2157*** 
 
(0.0350) (0.0343) (0.0423) (0.0403) (0.0468) (0.0453)    
       urbrate 0.0225*** 0.0185*** 0.0165*** 0.0113*** 0.0192*** 0.0143*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027)    
       pop65up -0.0727*** -0.0675*** 0.0226** 0.0236** 0.0270*** 0.0295*** 
 
(0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0081) (0.0082) 
Time trends       
  trend 
  
-0.0343*** -0.0323*** 
  
   
(0.0018) (0.0017) 
  trendl 
    
0.0064 0.0059 
     
(0.0042) (0.0040) 
trendm 
    
-0.0262*** -0.0256*** 
     
(0.0026) (0.0026) 
trendh 
    
-0.0410*** -0.0393*** 
     
(0.0019) (0.0019) 
          
  N 1143 1157 1143 1157 1143 1157 
AIC 16.227 18.491 15.869 18.216 15.925 18.197 
chi2 1306 1245 1927 1834.0201 2059.7147 1956.7946 
ll -8105.3 -9235.5 -7925.4 -9063.6175 -7897.8345 -9036.3352 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; N: number of observations; AIC: 
Akaike information criteria; chi2: Wald test statistic; ll: log likelyhood. 
 
 36 
 
 
Table 5. Results: Negative binomial estimates for accident counts (accidents with injuries). Full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  accfe1 accre1 accfe2 accre2 accfe3 accre3    
Institutional  variables                         
leveldemoc -0.0743*** -0.0768*** -0.0584*** -0.0639*** -0.0523*** -0.0574*** 
  (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0157) (0.0154)    
Infrastructure  variables 
     sharemw -6.7891*** -6.3538*** 0.2262 0.5233 1.1632* 1.2085**  
 
-15.478 -15.382 (0.9380) (0.7349) (0.4755) (0.4457)    
       density 0.1852*** 0.1146*** 0.2979*** 0.2399*** 0.3020*** 0.2497*** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0298) (0.0233) (0.0253) (0.0236) (0.0251)    
Socio-economic controls           
grthgdppc 0.0012 0.0017 -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0004    
 
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026)    
       lgdppc -0.3549*** -0.3626*** -0.2381*** -0.2979*** -0.2066*** -0.2444*** 
 
(0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0469) (0.0460) (0.0482) (0.0487)    
       urbrate 0.0163*** 0.0110*** 0.0210*** 0.0167*** 0.0207*** 0.0169*** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0024)    
       pop65up 0.0173* 0.0219** 0.0958*** 0.0965*** 0.0917*** 0.0908*** 
  (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0082)    
Time trends 
     trend 
  
-0.0322*** -0.0303*** 
 
                
   
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
 
                
trendl 
    
0.0274*** 0.0266*** 
     
(0.0056) (0.0053)    
trendm 
    
-0.0426*** -0.0409*** 
     
(0.0036) (0.0034)    
trendh 
    
-0.0329*** -0.0313*** 
     
(0.0019) (0.0019)    
       N 1110 1123 1110 1123 1110 1123 
AIC 21.994 24.659 21.675 24.380 21.646 24.346 
chi2 299 241 946 741 959 776 
ll -10990.00 -12320.00 -10830.00 -12180.00 -10810.00 -12160.00 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; N: number of observations; AIC: 
Akaike information criteria; chi2: Wald test statistic; ll: log likelyhood. 
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Table 6. Results: Negative binomial estimates for fatality counts. Democracies only 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8)    
  fatfe1 fatre1 fatfe2 fatre2 fatfe3 fatre3 fatfe4 fatre4    
Institutional  
variables                             
leveldemoc -0.1209* -0.1336* -0.1243* -0.1272* -0.1803** -0.1861** -0.1580* -0.1657**  
 
(0.0561) (0.0553) (0.0605) (0.0590) (0.0634) (0.0617) (0.0640) (0.0623)    
major -0.6293*** -0.5999*** -0.6696*** -0.6286*** -0.6241*** -0.5730*** -0.6438*** -0.5847*** 
 
(0.0631) (0.0606) (0.0621) (0.0596) (0.0630) (0.0608) (0.0637) (0.0616)    
presidential -0.1129* -0.0912 0.0043 0.0319 0.0100 0.0399 -0.0032 0.0228    
  (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0464) (0.0471) (0.0474) (0.0480) (0.0472) (0.0482)    
Infrastructure  
variables 
       paved -0.0051*** -0.0054*** -0.0027* -0.0031** -0.0029** -0.0032** -0.0033** -0.0036*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)    
density -0.0260* -0.0342** -0.0294* -0.0387** -0.0203 -0.0294* -0.0151 -0.0256*   
 
(0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0116)    
Socio-economic  
controls               
grthgdppc 0.0071* 0.0073** 0.0059* 0.0066* 0.0044 0.0050 0.0033 0.0043    
 
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)    
lgdppc -0.3067*** -0.3509*** -0.2099*** -0.2771*** -0.1067* -0.1703*** -0.1097* -0.1756*** 
 
(0.0366) (0.0355) (0.0381) (0.0369) (0.0447) (0.0429) (0.0454) (0.0433)    
urbrate 0.0133*** 0.0077** 0.0180*** 0.0119*** 0.0187*** 0.0124*** 0.0200*** 0.0134*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)    
pop65up -0.0793*** -0.0690*** -0.0067 -0.0016 -0.0040 0.0021 -0.0008 0.0048    
  (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0104)    
Time trends 
       trend 
  
-0.0236*** -0.0223*** 
   
                
   
(0.0017) (0.0017) 
   
                
trendl 
    
0.0030 0.0040 0.0003 0.0015    
     
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0039)    
trendm 
    
-0.0182*** -0.0174*** -0.0186*** -0.0180*** 
     
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)    
trendh 
    
-0.0287*** -0.0281*** -0.0300*** -0.0293*** 
     
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019)    
         Democratization 
timing effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
N 1190 1198 1190 1198 1190 1198 1190 1198 
AIC 16.133 18.385 15.959 18.230 15.941 18.209 15.921 18.192 
chi2 937 970 1204 1158 1220 1160 1351 1274 
ll -8057 -9181 -7969 -9102 -7958 -9089 -7938 -9071 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; N: number of observations; AIC: 
Akaike information criteria; chi2: Wald test statistic; ll: log likelyhood. 
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Table 7. Results: Negative binomial estimates for accident counts (accidents with injuries). 
Democracies only 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  accfe1 accre1 accfe2 accre2 accfe3 accre3 accfe4 accre4    
Institutional  
variables                             
leveldemoc -0.1638* -0.1903** -0.1367 -0.1645* -0.1707* -0.2045** -0.1534* -0.1839*   
 
(0.0723) (0.0721) (0.0731) (0.0734) (0.0768) (0.0769) (0.0777) (0.0779)    
major -0.4234*** -0.3770*** -0.3702*** -0.3266*** -0.3124*** -0.2632*** -0.3265*** -0.2718*** 
 
(0.0625) (0.0612) (0.0615) (0.0601) (0.0628) (0.0612) (0.0632) (0.0614)    
presidential 0.1309* 0.1250* 0.2486*** 0.2500*** 0.2379*** 0.2360*** 0.2286*** 0.2248*** 
  (0.0539) (0.0542) (0.0526) (0.0533) (0.0531) (0.0537) (0.0534) (0.0542)    
Infrastructure  
variables 
       
paved -0.0077*** -0.0081*** -0.0046*** -0.0051*** -0.0040*** -0.0044*** -0.0045*** -0.0047*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)    
density 0.0034 -0.0112 0.0113 -0.0038 0.0127 -0.0020 0.0107 -0.0058    
 
(0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0132) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0142)    
Socio-economic  
controls               
grthgdppc 0.0036 0.0043 0.0026 0.0038 0.0019 0.0029 0.0014 0.0028    
 
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029)    
lgdppc -0.3947*** -0.3892*** -0.2975*** -0.3157*** -0.2133*** -0.2193*** -0.2419*** -0.2488*** 
 
(0.0374) (0.0370) (0.0390) (0.0382) (0.0474) (0.0466) (0.0488) (0.0476)    
urbrate 0.0228*** 0.0183*** 0.0253*** 0.0204*** 0.0249*** 0.0200*** 0.0251*** 0.0200*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025)    
pop65up 0.0632*** 0.0624*** 0.1095*** 0.1070*** 0.1054*** 0.1022*** 0.1091*** 0.1057*** 
  (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0094)    
Time trends 
        
trend 
  
-0.0228*** -0.0219*** 
   
                
   
(0.0017) (0.0017) 
   
                
trendl 
    
0.0146** 0.0165*** 0.0124** 0.0142**  
     
(0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0044)    
trendm 
    
-0.0293*** -0.0296*** -0.0291*** -0.0297*** 
     
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032)    
trendh 
    
-0.0251*** -0.0245*** -0.0253*** -0.0247*** 
     
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)    
         Democratization 
timing effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
N 1153 1160 1153 1160 1153 1160 1153 1160 
AIC 22.088 24.782 21.933 24.642 21.914 24.617 21.911 24.613 
chi2 402 377 608 544 629 573 670 612 
ll -1103.00 -1238.00 -1096.00 -1231.00 -1094.00 -1229.00 -1093.00 -1228.00 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. *** p<0.001; N: number of observations; AIC: 
Akaike information criteria; chi2: Wald test statistic; ll: log likelyhood. 
 39 
 
Table 8. Correlation matrix1 
 
presidential pop65up lgdppc paved trend trendh trendm trendl 
presidential 1.00 
       pop65up -0.51 1.00 
      lgdppc -0.41 0.72 1.00 
     paved -0.38 0.60 0.56 1.00 
    trend 0.02 0.19 0.11 0.16 1.00 
   trendh -0.36 0.63 0.72 0.47 0.39 1.00 
  trendm 0.26 -0.25 -0.28 -0.10 0.38 -0.51 1.00 
 trendl 0.32 -0.44 -0.67 -0.31 0.30 -0.46 0.39 1.00 
1 variables with correlation coefficients greater than 0.4  
 
Road safety determinants: do institutions matter? 
 
Abstract 
Road safety is a global health problem and its severity in developing countries highlights the 
need for research to address its causes. We explore the effect of institutional variables on road 
safety, redressing the literature’s failure to consider political institutions as road safety 
determinants. Specifically, we analyze the effect on traffic accidents and fatalities of different 
political regimes, electoral rules and forms of government and we control for other factors. By 
drawing on an international sample of countries taken over a long time-span, we find that 
democratic institutions are associated with better road safety. The beneficial effects of 
democratization become apparent after about four years in countries undergoing a regime 
transition and are also discernible in established democracies that are consolidating their 
political institutions. Finally, our results suggest that road safety can be characterized as a local 
public good and that its provision is greater in parliamentary systems.  
 
 
